

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CONAKR 00322 01 OF 02 161413Z  
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10  
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06  
AID-05 HA-05 EUR-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 COME-00  
AGRE-00 ABF-01 IGA-02 XMB-02 OES-07 CU-04 INT-05  
/111 W

-----042911 161519Z /53

R 161320Z FEB 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4012

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CONAKRY 0322

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, GV  
SUBJECT: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN GUINEA: OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES

REF: (A) 77 STATE 291277, (B) CONAKRY 86

1. EMBASSY'S BROAD APPROACH TO GUINEA IS ONE OF "FRANK DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION". THIS MEANS BEING RESPONSIVE ENOUGH TO GUINEA'S INTERESTS TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO GOG'S LEADERSHIP, BE ABLE TO EXERT LEVERAGE AND NURTURE INCREASINGLY VISIBLE TRENDS TOWARD GENUINE NONALIGNMENT, GREATER INVOLVEMENT WITH WESTERN ECONOMIES, AND IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. IT MEANS FREQUENTLY TELLING GOG WHAT WE CONSIDER "ALIGNED" ACTIONS DAMAGING TO US INTERESTS (GUINEAN COOPERATION IN SOVIET TU-95 FLIGHTS, SOVIET MILITARY AIRLIFTS, SOVIET NAVAL BASE RIGHTS AND UNREASONABLE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN GUINEA) OR DAMAGING TO GUINEA'S IMAGE ABROAD (HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS). OBVERSELY, IT MEANS CONVINCING GOG THAT IF US INTERESTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE TAKEN MORE INTO ACCOUNT, US WILL BE ABLE TO DO CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY FOR GUINEA'S DEVELOPMENT. IT ALSO MEANS NOT REPEAT NOT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CONAKR 00322 01 OF 02 161413Z

ENGAGING IN PUBLIC POLEMICS WITH GUINEA ABOUT NONALIGNMENT OR HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT INSTEAD BUILDING CONFIDENCE QUIETLY WITH TOURE AND HIS MINISTERS AND DEVELOPING GRADUATED SCALE OF ACTIONS THAT WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO GUINEA'S OWN MOVES AND PROVIDE CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE US. WE PUT MORE

TRUST IN THIS APPROACH THAN IN RETALIATORY, PUNITIVE ACTIONS WHICH WOULD AROUSE GUINEAN RESENTMENT AND RESISTANCE.

2. OBJECTIVE FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO EFFECTIVENESS OF "FRANK DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION". TRENDS FAVORABLE TO THE WEST ARE GATHERING MOMENTUM IN GUINEA. DISILLUSIONMENT WITH SOVIET PROMISES IS PALPABLE. TWENTY YEARS OF HOME-GROWN SOCIALIST DOGMA HAVE STUNTED ECONOMY AND LEFT GUINEA'S RICH POTENTIAL UNREALIZED, HER PEOPLE AS POOR AS ANY OTHER IN WEST AFRICA. PRESSURES ARE ON SEKOU TOURE TO SEEK MORE PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS, BARGAIN HARDER WITH SOVIETS, OPEN MORE TO THE WEST, AND RELAX INTERNAL CONTROLS. EVIDENCE OF THIS FAVORABLE TREND INCLUDES TOURE'S DECISION TO BAN TU-95'S (HE HAS KEPT HIS PROMISE), REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN-22 AIRLIFT TRANSIT TO ETHIOPIA, DECISION TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA, PARDONING OF GUINEAN EXILES ABROAD, INITIATIVE TOWARD RECONCILIATION WITH IVORY COAST AND SENEGAL, DECISION TO BEGIN WHOLESALE RELEASES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS, DECISION TO INVITE RED CROSS (ICRC) DELEGATION, OBLIQUE CRITICISM OF SOVIET ROLE IN HORN OF AFRICA, DECISION TO REFUSE SOVIETS PERMISSION TO CONSTRUCT NEW INSTALLATIONS AROUND  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CONAKR 00322 01 OF 02 161413Z

CONAKRY, OPEN PRAISE FOR US AGRICULTURE AND US-CANADIAN BAUXITE PROJECT AT BOKE AND EXPRESSION OF HOPE FOR MORE US INVESTMENT, IMPROVEMENT IN CONSUMER GOODS SUPPLY THROUGH TACIT TOLERATION OF SOME PRIVATE TRADING IDEOLOGY NOTWITHSTANDING, AND GENERALLY MORE RELAXED ATMOSPHERE IN THE COUNTRY. TREND DOES NOT REPEAT NOT INCLUDE ALTERATION OF GUINEA'S "SOCIALIST" IDEOLOGY AND DISCIPLINED PARTY-STATE STRUCTURE, DISSOCIATION FROM LOOSE "SOCIALIST" OR "RADICAL" WORLD, OR MAJOR REJECTION OF SOVIETS. LIMITS ON CURRENT TREND CLEARLY EXIST. BACKSLIDING -- PARTICULARLY IF SOVIETS RAISE THE ANTE -- CANNOT BE RULED OUT. BUT INTERESTING FACT IS THAT SO MUCH HAS OCCURRED IN THE LAST EIGHT MONTHS EVEN GIVEN SO LITTLE CONCRETE US RESPONSE.

3. KEY POLICY ISSUE FACING US IN GUINEA IN NEXT TWO YEARS IS HOW TO DEVELOP GRADUATED RESPONSE THAT WILL PROVIDE CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION OF POSITIVE ADVANTAGES TO GUINEA IF GOG CONTINUES TO MOVE IN FAVORABLE DIRECTION. BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS HERE IS NOT TO CONDEMN OR HUMILIATE

GOG, BUT TO DEMONSTRATE PRACTICAL RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN GUINEA'S PERFORMANCE AND GENERAL PROSPECTS  
OF US AID AND FINANCING. SO FAR WE HAVE PROVIDED  
\$5.5 MILLION OF FY 78 PL-480 FOOD ASSISTANCE (AS  
INDIRECT RESPONSE TO GOG'S SUSPENSION OF TU-95  
FLIGHTS), BUT SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW SUM REQUESTED.  
ON OTHER MAJOR ISSUES, WE HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE OR  
INCONCLUSIVE; WE HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO GOG'S REQUEST  
FOR PATROL CRAFT; EXIM BANK HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO  
PROVIDE NORMAL FINANCING FOR GOG'S BOEING 737  
PURCHASE; US STEEL IS UNDECIDED ON PARTICIPATION IN  
MIFERGUI-NIMBA IRON ORE PROJECT, DELAY OF WHICH  
WOULD BE MAJOR BLOW TO GOG PLANS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOP-  
MENT AND HOPES FOR SUPPORT FROM US PRIVATE SECTOR.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 CONAKR 00322 01 OF 02 161413Z

NO ACTION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN ON GOG'S REQUEST FOR  
INCREASE OF PL-480 FUNDING TO KEEP DECEMBER 10  
AGREEMENT TO QUANTITIES ORIGINALLY EXPECTED. GOG  
REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL FY 78 PL-480 DROUGHT FOOD  
AID HAS BEEN RECEIVED, AND USG RESPONSE IS PENDING.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CONAKR 00322 02 OF 02 161432Z  
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10  
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06  
AID-05 EUR-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 COME-00 AGRE-00  
ABF-01 IGA-02 XMB-02 OES-07 HA-05 CU-04 INT-05  
/111 W

-----043252 161517Z /53

R 161320Z FEB 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4013

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 CONAKRY 0322

4. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE TRIED TO KEEP MOMENTUM GOING  
ON SECONDARY MATTERS: EMERGENCY FACILITATION OF  
TEXACO GASOLINE PURCHASE DURING SOVIET-CAUSED GAS

SHORTAGE IN CONAKRY; SIGNATURE OF SECOND STAGE OF \$7.5 MILLION AID AGRICULTURE TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (CONCEIVED SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE); VISIT OF REGIONAL AID DIRECTOR TO ADVISE ON WAYS TO EXPEDITE PROJECT; EXPLORATION OF SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT TO MAKE POSSIBLE EXIM FINANCING FOR BOEING 737; TALKS WITH GOG ON HOW WE COULD ASSIST WITH TEN-POINT GOG REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IN AGRICULTURAL AREA; STEPPED UP SELF-HELP ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO SET UP ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING COURSES FOR GOG CADRES AND TO INCREASE SOMEWHAT EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND SPORTS EXCHANGES.

5. THE BASIC REQUIREMENT IS THUS FOR POSITIVE RESPONSE ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANTIAL MOMENT TO GOG, AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE, WHICH TOGETHER FORM NECESSARY POSITIVE BACKGROUND FOR OUR PRESSURE ON GOG FOR FURTHER MEANINGFUL IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- ADDITIONAL PL-480 COMMODITIES ARE CRITICALLY  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CONAKR 00322 02 OF 02 161432Z

IMPORTANT TO GUINEA AND OFFER MOST FLEXIBLE, PRACTICAL WAY OF RESPONDING IN NEXT FEW MONTHS;  
-- WHILE US STEEL DECISION ON MIFERGUI-NIMBA IS LARGELY BEYOND USG CONTROL, IT WILL HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL IMPACT ON US/GUINEAN RELATIONS AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED, AS SHOULD PROPOSED REYNOLDS PARTICIPATION IN DABOLA BAUXITE PROJECT AND OTHER US PRIVATE INVESTMENT.  
-- MORE FAVORABLE EXIM BANK ATTITUDE TOWARD GUINEA IS APPROPRIATE AND NEEDS TO BE WORKED OUT.  
-- FULL FY 78-9 FUNDING OF AID PROJECT AND ASSIGNMENT SOONEST OF AID PROJECT MANAGER ARE IMPERATIVE.  
-- GUINEANS HAVE NOT RECENTLY RAISED PATROL BOAT ISSUE, BUT WE STILL OWE THEM RESPONSE. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL COSMETICALLY TO BE ABLE TO OFFER AT LEAST FACILITATION OF COMMERCIAL SALE OF NON-MILITARY CRAFT WHICH COULD DO FISHING PATROL WORK, EVEN THOUGH PRIMIN BEAVOGUT'S REQUEST IN JUNE 1977 WAS CLEARLY FOR GRANT, NOT PURCHASE.

6. "COOPERATION-DIALOGUE" APPROACH REQUIRES CONTINUED RESPONSIVENESS AND HIGH-LEVEL COMMUNICATION: VISIT BY AMBASSADOR QOUNG COULD PROVIDE IDEAL VEHICLE FOR DISCUSSION OF HUMAN-RIGHTS CONCERNS AND WHAT US SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT HAVE TO OFFER AFRICAN STATES. US SHOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE GOG VISITORS AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL IN WASHINGTON. QUICK ANSWERS TO GOG COMMUNICATIONS,

IF ONLY TO SAY PROPOSALS ARE BEING EXAMINED  
(E.G. REYNOLDS), SHOW GOG THAT ITS INTERESTS ARE  
BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY, BOLSTERING GUINEAN SENSE OF  
CONFIDENCE AND WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH US. TIMING  
AND STYLE OF US REACTION ARE OFTEN AS IMPORTANT AS  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CONAKR 00322 02 OF 02 161432Z

ACTUAL SUBSTANCE OF RESPONSE OR EXTENT OF ASSISTANCE  
GRANTED.

7. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF ABOVE APPROACHES  
OVER NEXT TWO YEARS:

(A) EMBASSY BUDGET WILL REMAIN ABOUT THE SAME  
SIZE, WITH DUE ALLOWANCE FOR INFLATION, ASSUMING NO  
APPRECIABLE INCREASE IN SHARED ADMINISTRATIVE  
SUPPORT REQUIRED.

(B) AID AFFAIRS OFFICER WILL BE NEEDED TO  
SUPERVISE MAIN AID PROJECT, AND  
TO DEVELOP PRINCIPAL FOLLOW-ON AID PROJECT FOR  
1980-85, PROBABLY ALSO IN AGRICULTURE. ADDITIONAL  
FUNDS WILL BE REQUIRED TO THE EXTENT NEW PL-480 OR  
NEW PROJECTS AGREED. EMERGENCY DROUGHT ASSISTANCE IS  
APT TO AMOUNT TO SOME \$6,000,000.

(C) CULTURAL EXCHANGE BUDGET WILL NEED AT  
LEAST FIFTY PERCENT INCREASE TO COVER DESIRABLE  
INCREASES IN IVP GRANTS, TECHNICAL SCIENTIFIC  
AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES.

(D) USIS INFORMATION PROGRAM BUDGET,  
INCLUDING CONTINUATION OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING,  
SHOULD BE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY TO TAKE  
ADVANTAGE OF RELAXING INTERNAL CONTROLS.

(E) SELF-HELP BUDGET COULD USEFULLY BE  
INCREASED FROM \$30,000 TO \$50,000 AS THERE ARE  
MORE WORTHWHILE LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS  
THAN CAN BE CURRENTLY FUNDED.  
CROSBY

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORTS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 16 feb 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978CONAKR00322  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X3  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780071-1027  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** CONAKRY  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780249/aaaabovu.tel  
**Line Count:** 268  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 3f34dbd5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION AF  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 77 STATE 291277, 78 CONAKRY 86  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 18 jul 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3576925  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN GUINEA: OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES  
**TAGS:** AMGT, PFOR, GV  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/3f34dbd5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014